Many theoretical results rely on delayed review of imperfect information for sustaining cooperative outcomes. This paper uses a laboratory experiment designed around a repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect monitoring to study what effect delay has on cooperation in practice. Information was received in every period of the game in one treatment and every other period of the game in another. While the parameters were chosen so that equilibrium welfare is higher with delay, the welfare levels in the two treatments were similar. Moreover, subjects were less likely to cooperate with than without delay in additional treatments where the game was played against a computer with an equilibrium trigger strategy. The results suggest that the cooperating-enhancing effect of exogenous delay of information may be smaller than predicted for two reasons: endogenous leniency in subjects' punishment strategies and an element of randomness in behavior.
Introduction
Imperfect information is often reviewed with delay. Examples of this can be found in meetings with parole officers for criminal offenders (which, depending on the circumstances, may take place once a week or a month), bonus payments given to managers of organizations (which are typically given on an annual basis), tenure evaluations in academia (which typically involve periods of several years), targets in climate change agreements, re-elections of politicians, and elsewhere.
A theoretical justification for delayed review is that it allows for more efficient provision of incentives. To understand why, consider a repeated game in which players observe each other's actions with noise.
1 Incentive compatibility requires that bad signalssignals associated with defection-are punished, while good signals-signals association with cooperation-are rewarded. Because a bad signal is received with some probability even if both players are cooperating, some amount of punishment will always take place on the equilibrium path, bounding welfare away from efficiency. One way to allow for more efficient punishment is to lump signals together and deliver them in blocks. If the signals are delivered two a time, for example, a punishment phase might be triggered only in the case two consecutive bad signals are observed. 2 The insight that delay of information can be welfare-improving was first made by Abreu et al. (1991) and has since been widely used and accepted in the theoretical literature on repeated games. 3 The present paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment designed to study what effect delayed review of imperfect information has in practice. The experiment was designed around several treatments, some in which the game was played between two human subjects (the game treatments), and others in which it was played against a computer with a known strategy (the decision treatments). In the game treatments, the subjects were randomly matched into groups of two to play an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect public monitoring. Instead of observing each other's actions or payoffs, they observed a binary public signal (good or bad) that depended 1 Technically, a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. 2 Such block strategies cannot be supported in equilibrium if the signals are public (identical for every player) and not received with delay. If a player sees that the signal was good in the first period, he knows that he can defect in the second because he will not be punished regardless of what signal is realized.
3 See, e.g., Kandori and Matsushima (1998) , Compte (1998) , Obara (2009) , Ely et al. (2005) , Hörner and Olszewski (2006) , Fuchs (2007) , Rahman (2014) , and Sugaya (2016) . It is noteworthy that, unlike in Abreu et al.(1991) , delayed review of information is endogenous in much of the repeated games literature, especially the literature on repeated games with private monitoring. Although this article focuses on exogenous delay, the results also show some evidence of endogenous leniency in subjects' strategies, as discussed in more detail below.
on the players' chosen action profile. A good signal was more likely than a bad signal if both players cooperated, while a bad signal was more likely if one or more of the players defected.
The signal was observed in every period of the game in the treatment without delay, and in every two periods of the game in the treatment with delay, with parameters chosen so that a greater optimal level of cooperation was predicted with delay, as in Abreu et al. (1991) . Thus, the experiment allowed subjects to attain more cooperative outcomes by exogenously delaying information and tested whether subjects were able to take advantage of this opportunity. Contrary to the Abreu et al. (1991) prediction, no significant effect of delayed review on cooperation was observed. Moreover, subjects' payoffs were as predicted in the treatment without delay and significantly smaller than predicted in the treatment with delay. I.e., delayed review did not lead to more efficient use of the observed information.
An analysis of the subjects' strategies sheds some light on these findings. The strategies used in the treatment without delay were lenient in the sense that the first negative signal (i.e., the signal associated with the period 1 action profile) was unpunished in period 2 of the supergame. 4 The same signal, however, had an effect in period 3. I.e., the subjects in the treatment without exogenous delay to some extent delayed their received information endogenously. As a result, the strategies used with and without delay were similar: endogenous leniency in subjects' strategies to some extent tempered the welfare-enhancing effect of delay. Moreover, the subjects' strategies in both of the game treatments depended not only on the public histories of signals but also on the private histories of past actions, which complicates the interpretation of the data.
5 To further investigate the effect of delayed review on cooperative behavior, the experiment included four additional treatments in which the same repeated game was played against a computer with a known trigger strategy. The best response to the computer's strategy in the decision treatments was unique. Thus, the difficulty associated with formulating theoretical predictions for private strategies was not of concern in these treatments. Moreover, the decision treatments removed multiplicity of predictions from the problem, thereby ruling out explanations of behavior based on equilibrium 4 The observed leniency is consistent with the results in Fudenberg et al. (2012) . 5 Following much of the theoretical literature as well as existing experimental studies (e.g., Aoyagi and Fréchette 2009) , the predictions for the game treatments are formulated on the basis of the most efficient equilibrium in strongly symmetric public strategies. Public strategies, which only condition behavior on histories of public signals, are motivated in Chapter 7 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006) by several observations, e.g., that every pure strategy induces the same distribution over outcomes as some public pure strategy. A strategy that is not public is private. While a number of folk theorems make use of private strategies to prove that near-efficient outcomes are sustainable in equilibrium as δ → 1, there is no method for obtaining the bounds on equilibrium welfare with such strategies for a fixed discount favor. If private strategies are allowed, it is not clear whether optimal equilibrium welfare is greater in the treatment with delay.
3 selection or strategic uncertainty.
6
The decision treatments manipulated the computer's punishment strategy as well as the presence of delayed review. A lenient strategy punished bad signals with a low probability, while a tough strategy punished them with a high probability. For each kind of strategy (tough or lenient), the experiment included a treatment with and without delay. The parameters were such that (i) full cooperation was optimal whenever the computer had a tough strategy, (ii) full defection was optimal in the lenient decision treatment without delay, and (iii) a cooperation rate of 50% was optimal in the lenient decision treatment with delay. Thus, the tough treatments tested whether delayed review leads to a difference in cooperation rates when no such difference is predicted in theory, while the lenient treatments tested whether subjects cooperate more with delay when this is what the theory predicts, as in the game treatments.
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Subjects' behavior showed no effect of delay on cooperation in the lenient treatments (as in the game treatments) and a cooperation-reducing effect of delay in the tough treatments. Moreover, whether or not information was delayed affected what strategies the subjects used in both the lenient and the tough treatments. Specifically, subjects in both treatments with delay were significantly more likely to use a strategy that alternates between defecting in odd periods of the supergame and cooperating in even periods than those in the treatments without delay. As argued in Section 4, these results can be rationalized using a simple stochastic choice model that assumes that the probability of deviating from the optimal strategy is inversely proportional to how tight the incentive constraint is. The common thread running through both the game and the decision treatments is that the cooperation-enhancing effect of delayed review of imperfect information may in practice be smaller than predicted. In the game treatments, this was driven by endogenous leniency in subjects' punishment strategies, while in the decision treatments it was driven by an element of randomness in choice.
This paper contributes to the experimental literature on repeated games, an exhaustive review of which is provided in Frechette and Dal Bo (2017) . The most closely related studies in this literature are Bigoni et al. (2012) , Evdokimov and Rahman (2014) , and Kobayashi et al. (2016) , a recent project developed concurrently with this one. Bigoni et al. (2012) examines whether very short and very long reaction lags are associated with smaller cooperation rates than intermediate ones in a repeated game with imperfect monitoring and finds mixed evidence in favor of this prediction. Evdokimov and Rahman (2014) finds that delay reduces cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect monitoring and quasicontinuous time. Kobayashi et al. (2016) studies delayed review in an environment similar to Aoyagi and Fréchette (2009) and finds that it decreases cooperation with some parameter specifications and has no effect with others. What distinguishes this paper from the abovecited studies is that it examines decision problems with unique predictions in addition to related games. The common thread running through both sets of treatments in this paper is that the cooperation-enhancing effect of delay is smaller than predicted.
Game Treatments
The game treatments were designed around a two-player repeated prisoner's dilemma with a discount factor of δ = 0.95 and the stage game payoffs shown in Table 1a .
8 In each period t of the supergame, each player chose between cooperation (C t ) and defection (D t ). Instead of observing each other's actions, both players observed a binary public signal that was good with probability p(a t ) and bad with probability 1 − p(a t ), with p(a t ) as shown in Table 1b . In the treatment without delay, the subjects observed the public signal in every period of the game (following the initial period) for as long as the game lasted. In the treatment with delay, subjects observed the public signals in periods 3, 5, 7, 9, etc. of the game. I.e., in period 1, both players chose their initial actions. Although a signal was realized in period 2, it was not immediately observed. After the period 2 decisions were made, the signals associated with both period 1's and period 2's decisions were observed in period 3, and so forth.
Predictions
As shown in Abreu et al. (1991) , the maximal symmetric public equilibrium payoff 10 in the game without delay can be achieved by a trigger strategy that cooperates in the first period of the supergame, continues to cooperate as long as a good signal is observed, and defects forever with probability α following a bad signal. The average discounted payoff v from this strategy satisfies the following value recursion equation:
Incentive compatibility requires that
Notice that the incentive constraint holds with equality in the best equilibrium, since otherwise α can be decreased to increase v. It follows that v = 10 − 10 0.3 0.9−0.3 = 5. It is trivial to verify that α ≈ 0.18, i.e. that the strategy if feasible.
In the game without delay, consider a trigger strategy that cooperates in the first two periods of the super game, continues to cooperate as long as anything other than two bad signals is observed, and defects forever with probability α following two bad signals. The average discounted payoff v from this strategy satisfies the following value recursion equation: Abreu et al. (1991) show that as long as this strategy discourages a defection in the first period of the first two period block, it discourages any other pattern of defections. It follows that the relevant incentive constraint is:
10 Other, less cooperative equilibria exist both with and without delay even in public strategies: it is, for instance, a best response for a player to fully defect if the other player is fully defecting. Moreover, it is possible that more efficient equilibria are available in private strategies. While formulating predictions around the most efficient symmetric public equilibrium is standard in the repeated games literature, the multiplicity inherent in the problem and subjects' possible use of private strategies motivate the decision treatments described later in the paper.
Because the incentive constraint must hold with equality in the best equilibrium, it follows that v = 10 − 10 1−δ 1−δ 2 0.3 0.9−0.3 ≈ 7.44. It is easy to check that the strategy is feasible (α ≈ 0.41).
Thus, the welfare associated with the best possible equilibrium is greater in the presence of delayed review, which implies the following testable prediction: Prediction 1. In the game treatments, subjects cooperate more in the presence of delayed review.
Implementation
The experiment was conducted at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México in Mexico City in October 2017 using the software z -Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) , with treatments implemented between subjects.
11 After every subject in the session handed in the consent form, the subjects received their treatment's instructions. 12 While the instructions were being read by the subjects, five quiz questions were displayed on their computer screens. 13 The subjects were given 10 minutes to read the instructions and complete the quiz.
14 After every subject completed the quiz, each subject saw a screen asking him or her to make the decision associated with the first period of the first supergame. It was common knowledge that the subjects were randomly and anonymously matched for each supergame. Following Murnighan and Roth (1983) , the discount factor was identified with the probability of the game continuing for an additional period.
15 The players had an unlimited amount of time to make a decision in every period, with actions neutrally labeled as orange (C) and purple (D). The first supergame to begin 45 minutes after the beginning of the quiz was the last supergame in every session.
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The subjects were given a show up fee of 500 points at the beginning of the first supergame, and it was explained in the instructions that this is done to minimize the possibility 11 Thus, every subject either played games with delay or games without delay. 12 The instructions for the experiment can be found in the appendix. 13 The questions were identical for both treatments and tested the subjects' understanding of how they were to be matched in the experiment, the termination rule, the payoffs in the game, and the monitoring technology. The answers to all of the quiz questions were incentivized: each subject gained two Mexican pesos for each quiz question correctly answered.
14 Only one of 122 subjects in the experiment failed to complete the quiz on time, and the average score was 8.6, suggesting that 10 minutes were sufficient for answering the questions. 15 In the experiment, the software selected a random number between 0 and 1 at the beginning of every period of a supergame and showed it to every subject in the session. If Draw A was less than or equal to 0.05, the game ended in that period for every subject in the session, as in Aoyagi and Fréchette (2009). 16 While is theoretically possible that such an experiment will last for several hours or even days, the probability of this happening is small. In the experiment, the largest number of periods in any supergame was 71 and every session ended in less than 90 minutes.
of suffering an overall loss.
17 The points were converted to pesos at a rate of four points per peso, so that each subject's overall earnings in the experiment were determined as follows:
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T otal earnings = 500 + P oints f rom quiz + P oints f rom all periods of all supergames 4 .
Each subject was privately paid his or her accumulated earnings following the last period of the last supergame in the session.
Results
Data was collected from 122 subjects (60 in the game without delay and 62 in the game with delay) in October 2017 at at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México in Mexico City. On average, a session had 88.63 periods and 3.75 supergames.
19 An average subject earned 246 pesos, roughly the cost of an official airport taxi to the author's house. Information about the number of subjects, supergames, and periods in each session of the game treatments is reported in Table 2 Table 2 : Subjects, supergames, and periods per session in the game treatments. 17 In practice, subjects' earnings in points were always positive, and the largest point losses, subtracted from the 500 point endowment, amounted to 85.
18 Subjects in Aoyagi and Fréchette (2009) were similarly paid for every decision they made. 19 Recall that the experiment was designed so that a supergame lasts 20 periods on average. 20 Subjects in the game treatments experienced few supergames as a result of the high discount factor (δ = 0.95), which was necessary for delay to have a welfare-improving effect. Thus, the experiment was not conducive to studying learning across supergames. Nevertheless, Figure 6 in Appendix A shows the evolution of cooperation over time in both treatments of the experiment. Although the figure suggests a downward trend in the treatment without delay, this trend is driven by a single session in the treatment without delay with six supergames (Table 2) , which was particularly uncooperative in the last supergame. In a logistic regression of a cooperation dummy against five supergame dummies and a constant term, the only coefficient significant at a 5% level is on the dummy variable associated with the sixth supergame (P < 0.01 with subject-clustered standard errors). If the offending session is excluded from the analysis, none of the supergame dummies is significant (smallest P = 0.261). Interestingly, subjects in the game without delay obtained an average payoff of 5.2, which is statistically indistinguishable from the best predicted payoff of 5 (P = 0.6171 according to a t-test). I.e., subjects fully took advantage of the opportunity to cooperate in the treatment without delay, at least if strongly symmetric public equilibrium is considered as the benchmark. Subjects in the game with delay obtained an average payoff of 5.05, which is significantly smaller than the predicted equilibrium payoff of 7.44 (P < 0.001 according to a t-test).
To explore the reasons behind Result 1, it it useful to analyze subjects' strategies in the two game treatments on a period-by-period basis. Table 5a compares behavior with and without delay in the first period of the supergame, where the average cooperation rate was close to 50% in both treatments, with no significant treatment effect (P = 0.7379). The lack of a treatment effect in the first period is perhaps not surprising given that the first period was subjectively very similar in the two treatments: the subject made an initial choice without knowing anything about the opponent's behavior. Table 5b reports behavior in period 2 as a function of the observed history (a 1 , s 2 ): the action taken in period 1, and the signal received in period 2. In the table, a 1 = C represents cooperation, a 1 = D represents defection, s 2 = g represents a good signal, and s 2 = b represents a bad signal. The standard errors are computed using a logit regression in which a cooperation dummy is modeled as a function of three dummy variables (representing three possible combinations of a 1 and s 2 , with the fourth used as a baseline), a delay dummy, and interactions between each of the (a 1 , s 2 ) dummies and the delay dummy, with standard errors clustered at the level of the subject.
The public equilibrium prediction is that s 2 has a significant effect without delay, while a 1 has no significant effect with or without delay. This prediction is rejected by the data. Thus, while the cooperation rate following a (C, g) history was higher than that following a (C, b) history in the treatment without delay, the difference was small (12%) and not statistically significant (P = 0.2585). Less surprisingly, the data also shows no significant effect of the public signal in the treatment without delay if the subject previously defected (P = 0.9502).
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The finding that the public signal had little effect in the treatment without delay mirrors that in in Fudenberg et al. (2012) , where the subjects often ignored their first negative signal in a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring. Moreover, according to (Fudenberg et al., 2012, p. 728) , "many subjects reported 'giving the benefit of the doubt' to an opponent on the first defection, assuming that it was a result of noise rather than purposeful malfeasance; only after two or three defections by their partner would they switch to defection themselves." This is consistent with the results reported here.
The period 2 cooperation rate following a (C, b) history was 35.5%-42.5% higher than that following a (D, b) history in both treatments (P < 0.001 with and without delay), suggesting that the subjects used private strategies. Comparing period 2 behavior with and without delay reveals no significant treatment effect. This is shown in the last column of 5b, which estimates the effect of delay following every possible period 2 history. The lack of a significant treatment effect in period 2 is consistent with the observations (i) that the public signal had little effect in the treatment without delay and (ii) that the previously taken action had similar effects in both treatments.
Behavior in the third period of the supergame is explored in Table 5c . Here, the average cooperation rateā 3 (a 1 , s 2 , a 2 , s 3 ) is shown as a function of the period 1 action, period 2 signal, period 2 action, and period 3 signal. 24 The table shows that the subjects in both game treatments responded to the public signal. 25 Specifically, the signal associated with the period 1 action had a sizable and significant effect on behavior in period 3 of the treatment without delay. Thus, the average cooperation rate following a (C, g, C, b) history was 47% higher than that following a (C, b, C, b) history (P < 0.001) in this treatment. Combined with the result that the period 1 signal had no significant effect on behavior in period 2, this result suggests that subjects in the treatment without (exogenous) delay of information endogenously delayed their response to the public signal. This is summarized below as follows:
Result 2. Subjects in the treatment without delay used private strategies with endogenous delay of information.
Table 5c also shows that the subjects responded to their observed histories somewhat differently with and without delay (Table 5c ). Specifically, they were more likely to cooperate in the treatment without delay following a (C, g, C, b) or (D, b, C, g) history in period 3 of the supergame (P < 0.05 and P < 0.01, respectively). Note, however, that these histories represent only about 15% of the period 3 observations. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, the effect for a (C, g, C, b) history loses significance when all odd periods of the game treatments are analyzed together. Overall, the effect of exogenous delay (the treatment variable) on period 3 behavior was small. Table 6a repeats the analysis in Table 5b for all even periods of the experiment. In the treatment without delay, the cooperation rate following a (C, g) history was 22% higher than that following a (C, b) history (P < 0.001). As a result, delayed review had a significant effect in the even periods following a (C, b) history (P < 0.05). I.e., if a subject previously (c) Period 3. Cooperation is a function of (a 1 , s 2 , a 2 , s 3 ), the period 1 action, the period 2 signal, the period 2 action, and the period 2 signal. Cooperation is a function of (a t−2 , s t−1 , a t−1 , s t ), the action taken two period ago, the signal received in the previous period, the action taken in the previous period, and the signal received in the current period. Table 6 : Behavior in even and odd periods of the supergame.
13 cooperated and a bad signal was received, he or she decreased her subsequent cooperation more in the treatment without delay than in the treatment with delay. The overall effect of the public signal in even periods without delay does not contradict Result 2 if that result is interpreted to concern endogenous delay of information in period 2 (similarly to how "leniency" concerns period 2 behavior in Fudenberg et al. 2012) . Moreover, despite the fact that the most recent signal had a significant effect in even periods of the treatment without delay, it also had a significant delayed effect in subsequent odd periods, in line with Result 2. This is discussed in more detail below. Table 6b repeats the analysis in Table 5c for all odd periods of the experiment. As in period 3, the signals played a significant role in determining cooperation in all odd periods considered together. The average cooperation rate following two cooperative actions and two good signals, for instance, was 37.1% higher than that following two cooperative actions and two bad signals in the treatment without delay (P < 0.001) and 49.8% higher in the treatment with delay (P < 0.001). The second column of Table 6b , which compares cooperation with and without delay for different recent histories, shows that subjects cooperated more following a (D, b, C, g) history in the treatment without delay (P < 0.01), in line with one of the treatment effects observed in period 3. No other treatment effect was significant at a 5% level in the odd periods.
Notably, the treatment effects identified in the last column of Table 6 were small in both even and odd periods. Thus, less than 5% of the observations in odd periods of the game followed (D, b, C, g)-type histories (the histories where a significant treatment effect is observed in the odd periods). Moreover, while cooperation in the even periods was more likely to decrease following a bad signal, it was also more likely to increase following a good signal.
26 In the data, the probability of a good signal was close to 50% if a cooperative action was played previously, which means that these two effects to some extent canceled out. These results are summarized below as follows:
Result 3. Exogenous delay of information had little effect on subjects' strategies in the game treatments. Table 6 provides additional evidence of the endogenous delay of public information suggested by Result 2. Thus, in odd periods of the treatment without delay, subjects were 20.7%
26 While the comparison of behavior with and without delay following a (C, g) history is not significant, the difference in cooperation following a (C, g) history without delay is significantly different from the average of the cooperation rate following a (C, g) history with delay and the cooperation rate following a (C, b) history with delay (P < 0.05). This comparison can be motivated by the fact that no signal is observed in the even periods of the treatment with delay. more likely to cooperate following a (C, g, C, b) history than following a (C, b, C, b) history (P < 0.001). Similarly, they were 29.5% more likely to cooperate following a (C, g, D, b) history than following a (C, b, D, b) history (P < 0.001). Both of these observations point to the signal received in the previous period having a delayed effect and provide a possible underpinning of Result 3.
While the number of sessions is small, the standard errors in Tables 5 and 6 can also be clustered at the session level to allow for across-subject correlations. All of the statistical comparisons supporting Results 2 and 3 are robust to this modification in the analysis.
27
Notice that Result 2 (which suggests the use of private strategies) is consistent with Result 1 (which suggests the lack of an overall treatment effect on welfare). Specifically, if private strategies are used, the greatest equilibrium welfare level may be similar with and without delay.
28 Thus, one possibility is that the subjects played an inefficient equilibrium in private strategies in both treatments. The difficulty in formulating predictions in the presence of private strategies and the multiplicity of equilibria inherent to repeated games motivate the decision treatments described below, in which the behavioral predictions are unique.
Decision Treatments
The decision treatments used the same timing, discount factor, payoffs, and monitoring technology as the game treatments, but unlike in the game treatments, the subjects played against the computer with a known grim trigger strategy. The strategy in every decision treatment started out by cooperating. In the treatments without delay (Lenient-NoDelay and Tough-NoDelay), the computer continued to cooperate as long as a good signal was observed in the preceding period. If a bad signal was observed, with probability α, the computer defected in every remaining period of the supergame. With probability 1 − α, the computer continued to cooperate. The parameter α was set to 0.1 in the LenientNoDelay treatment and 0.8 in the Tough-NoDelay treatment. Thus, the computer's strategy was tough when the probability of a punishment phase being triggered was higher. As is common in the theoretical literature on repeated games, the randomization device triggering the punishment was publicly observed, so that the the human player knew once the computer started defecting.
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In the treatments with delay (Lenient-Delay and Tough-Delay), the public signal was observed in every other period. In these treatments, the computer started out by cooperating in period 1 and period 2 of the supergame. In period 3, the computer continued to cooperate if anything other than two bad signals was observed. If both of the previous two signals were bad in the Lenient-Delay (resp., Tough-Delay) treatment, with probability α = 0.1 (resp., α = 0.8), the computer defected for the remainder of the supergame. Thus, the signals associated with the human participant's actions were reviewed in odd periods of the supergame following period 1 in the treatments with delay.
Predictions
The problem faced by the decision maker in the decision treatments without delay is recursive. Thus, if an action (cooperation or defection) is optimal in the first period of the problem without delay, the same action is also optimal in every period as long as the computer is also cooperating. Let C ∞ denote the strategy that cooperates as long as the computer is cooperating and D ∞ the strategy that always defects. Let the computer's punishment strategy be indexed by α ∈ {0.1, 0.8}. The average (per-period) payoffs associated with both strategies and both values of α can be easily computed and are reported in Table 7a .
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In the treatment with delay, the problem faced by the human participant every two periods is recursive. Hence, it's either a best response to cooperate as long as the computer is cooperating (C ∞ ), cooperate in every odd period and defect in every even one as long as 29 Although the game treatments did not explicitly include a public randomization device to avoid suggestion of specific strategies, several variables (e.g., the random draw associated with the discount factor) could have served as such. In the decision treatments, similar predictions (e.g., full cooperation in the tough treatment without delay) could have been achieved with other strategies. The form of the computer's punishment strategy (e.g., punishment of only two negative signals in the treatment with delay) was borrowed from the theoretical construction of Abreu et al. (1991) . Whether other strategy types lead to greater, similar, or smaller deviations from the theory is an empirical question that should be investigated in future research.
30 The per-period payoff v N oDelay C ∞ from using the strategy C ∞ satisfies the following value recursion equation:
Similarly, the average (per-period) payoff v N oDelay D ∞ from using the strategy D ∞ satisfies:
The calculations in the treatments with delay (Lenient-Delay or Tough-Delay) are similar.
the computer is cooperating ((CD) ∞ ), defect in every odd period and cooperate in every even one as long as the computer is cooperating ((DC) ∞ ), or defect in every period as long as the computer is cooperating (D ∞ ). The average per-period payoffs associated with each strategy for each value of α with delay are reported in Table 7b . Notice that C ∞ is optimal with and without delay when α = 0.8. When α = 0.1, D ∞ is optimal without delay, while (DC) ∞ is optimal with delay. This implies the following testable predictions:
Prediction 2. In the decision treatments, subjects cooperate more in the presence of delayed review when the computer's punishment strategy is lenient.
Prediction 3. In the decision treatments, subjects cooperation rates are unaffected by delay when the computer's punishment strategy is tough.
That cooperation is optimal in both of the tough treatments implies that the computer follows an equilibrium strategy in these treatments. Prediction 3 mirrors Prediction 1 (the prediction for the game treatments), as both suggest more cooperation with delay. However, the prediction for the game treatments is based on strongly symmetric perfect public equilibrium, while that for the lenient decision treatments is based on maximization of monetary earnings.
Implementation
The data was collected at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México in Mexico City in April 2016 using the software z -Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Since the experiment involved no strategic interaction, subjects quietly entered the lab at different assigned sign-up times.
31 After handing in the consent form, each subject received the instructions to one of the following four decision treatments (Lenient-NoDelay, Lenient-Delay, Tough-NoDelay, or Tough-Delay) and given unlimited time to read them. The subjects were told to raise their hands if they are ready to begin. If a subject raised his or her hand, the treatment was started for that subject. After a subject finished every decision problem in the treatment of the first half of the experiment, the old instructions were collected, and the instructions for the second half of the experiment were distributed. Subjects who played the game with delay in the first half of the experiment played the game without delay in the second half, and those who played the game without delay in the first half played the game with delay in the second half.
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The subjects were told that how long they will play the game will depend on the realization of a signal that will be positive with 70% probability if the orange button is chosen, and with 10% probability if the purple button is chosen. In the Lenient-NoDelay (resp., Tough-NoDelay) treatment, it was explained that if a negative signal is realized and the game does not end because of the discount factor (Draw A), then the computer will end the game with probability 0.1 (resp., 0.8).
33 In the treatments with delay, the signals were observed in periods 3, 5, 7, etc. of the supergame. In the Lenient-Delay (resp., Tough-Delay) treatment, the subjects were told that if two negative signals are realized in any odd period following period 1 and the game does not end because of the discount factor in this period, then the computer will end the game with probability 0.1 (resp., 0.8).
Notice from Table 1a that mutual defection is associated with a payoff of zero. Forcing both the human and the computer player to mutual defection instead of allowing the human to cooperate while the computer is defecting simplified the implementation considerably. Once the defection phase started, the subject did not have to wait until the game terminated because of δ. The alternative design in which the player himself switches to infinite defection and waits for the game to end would not have facilitated the testing of our theoretical 32 In two of the sessions (43 subjects), a subject was equally likely to experience each possible order of α's. Thus, there was a 25% chance of facing a tough strategy in the first half and a lenient one in the second, a 25% chance of facing a tough strategy in the first half a a tough one in the second, and so on. In the other two sessions (40 subjects), a subject that experienced a treatment with a tough strategy in the first half of the experiment experienced a treatment with a lenient strategy in the second half and vice versa. This happened because of experimenter error (instructions for some of the treatments were accidentally not printed). As shown in Table 11 and Table 12 of the appendix, there were virtually no significant session or session half effects in the data. 33 In the treatment without delay, a random number called Draw B selected a random number between 0 and 1 in every period of the game where Draw A allowed the game to continue and the most recent signal was negative. This random number was shown to the subjects, and the game ended if Draw B was less than or equal to α = 0.8. predictions because a player that understands the computer to be in a defection phase would know to also enter a defection phase (and obtain a per-period payoff of zero instead of −5). Such a design also would not have generated any interesting new predictions. It would, however, have made for a longer experiment.
Subjects' instructions in the decision treatments specified the exact number of decision problems in each half of the experiment. Specifically, in the Tough-NoDelay treatment, subjects played the supergame against the computer 150 times. In every other treatment, they played it 50 times. Because the Tough-NoDelay treatment was associated with a substantially higher probability of the game ending, more supergames were included in this condition to allow for monetary earnings per unit of time roughly comparable to those in the other conditions. Thus, most subjects played 100 supergames in total, while those assigned to the Tough-NoDelay treatment in one of the halves of the experiment played 200 supergames.
Subjects' points were converted to pesos at an exchange rate of 80 points per peso. As in the game treatments, the discount factor was identified with the probability of the decision problem continuing for an additional period, subjects had an unlimited amount of time to make a decision in every period, and the actions were neutrally labeled as orange (C) and purple (D). Each subject was privately paid his or her accumulated earnings after finishing the second half of the experiment.
Results
Data was collected from 83 subjects in the Spring semester of 2016 at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México in Mexico City in four sessions (26, 27, 16, and 14 subjects). On average, a decision problem lasted for 2.67 periods in the Tough-NoDelay treatment (max. of 22 periods), 8.04 periods in the Tough-Delay treatment (max. of 72 periods), 9.4 periods in the Lenient-NoDelay treatment (max. of 81 periods), and 15.37 periods in the LenientDelay treatment (max. of 108 periods). Subjects' average earnings were approximately 170 pesos. Table 8 reports the average cooperation rates in the first 50 supergames of the four decision treatments.
34 The averages are computed at the subject/half of the experiment level. I.e., for each subject, the average cooperation rate is computed for both treatments the 34 The exclusion comes from the fact that no treatment other than Tough-NoDelay had more than 50 supergames. As shown in Figure 7 in the appendix, there was significant learning of the optimal strategy in the Tough-NoDelay treatment. As a result, including later supergames in this treatment artificially inflates the effect of delay in the tough treatments. While the main text omits a discussion of learning for the sake of of brevity, some of the analysis of the subjects' strategies below focuses on later supergames as a robustness check. subject participated in, leading to 166 observations in total. The table suggests that subjects cooperated more in the tough than the lenient treatments, an observation confirmed by a ttest with standard errors clustered at the subject level (P < 0.001). 35 The table also suggests no overall effect of delay in the lenient (P = 0.885) or the tough (P = 0.376) treatments. In the case of the lenient treatments, this is at odds with the theoretical predictions, which imply more cooperation in the lenient treatments in the presence of delay.
No delay
Figure 1: Cooperation rates within a supergame in the decision treatments.
35 A non-parametric test is potentially problematic for this comparison, as behavior in the two halves of the experiment for a single subject might be correlated. All of the statistical comparisons below cluster the standard errors at the level of the subject. Table 9 : Cooperation rates in the even and odd periods of the decision treatments.
While the comparison of overall averages reveals no effect average effect of delay in either the lenient or the tough treatments, a deeper look at subjects' strategies shows a significant effect in both cases. As a step in this direction, Figure 1 reports average cooperation rates separately for each supergame period (1-21), taking the data from the first 50 supergames in every treatment.
36 The most striking feature of Figure 1 is the periodicity in subjects' cooperation rates in the Tough-Delay treatment. Specifically, the figure suggests that at least some subjects played a (D, C) ∞ -type strategy that alternated between cooperation and defection. To see whether this effect was significant on average, Table 9 explicitly compares cooperation in even and odd periods of the different decision treatments. The effect of delay in odd periods of the tough treatments was about 12.7% in magnitude and significant (P < 0.05), suggesting the following result:
Result 4. Subjects were more likely to defect in the odd periods of the Tough-Delay treatment than in the odd periods of the Tough-NoDelay treatment.
As a robustness check, the effect can be re-estimated using supergames 26 to 50 in the two treatments. Even with experience, the effect remains significant with a magnitude of 12.2% and P < 0.05. No other effect of delay was significant at a 5% level.
37
To further explore Result 4, Figure 2 shows how behavior of different individual subjects 36 Figure 8 in the appendix reports the same data as Figure 1 after removing subject-level fixed effects (using the coefficients of a regression in which a dummy variable for cooperating or not is regressed against a dummy for each supergame period, a dummy for whether information was delayed, a dummy for whether the computer used a tough punishment strategy, all possible interaction terms, and subject-level fixed effects). That Figure 1 and Figure 8 in the appendix look nearly identical suggests that the slight increase in cooperation rates across supergame periods is not simply capturing the fact that subjects who tend to cooperate more are more likely to survive until the end of the supergame. One possibility is that this is an artifact of a gambler's fallacy wherein subjects thought that longer games were more likely to terminate.
37 Looking at all supergames 1-50 with subject-clustered standard errors, P = 0.863 in odd periods of the lenient treatments, P = 0.953 in even periods of the tough treatments, P = 0.762 in even periods of the lenient treatments, P = 0.748 in the initial period of the tough treatments, and P = 0.628 in the initial period of the even treatments.
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(a) Tough-NoDelay. involved over time in the Tough-Delay and Tough-NoDelay treatments. Each cell in the figure represents a subject, with the average cooperation rate on the vertical axis (with a 0-100% scale) and the supergame period (1-21) on the horizontal axis. It is clear from the figure that subjects in the two treatments used strikingly different strategies. Specifically, subjects in the treatment with delay were noticeably more likely to alternate between cooperating and defecting than those in the treatment without delay.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 3 , the same was true in the lenient treatments. Thus, while delay had no effect on average cooperation in these treatments, it had a clearly apparent effect on the strategies of individual subjects. Some subjects in the Lenient-Delay treatment alternated between cooperating and defecting while others alternated between defecting and cooperating; on average, the two kinds of alternations cancelled each other out. The subjects with alternating strategies in the Tough-Delay treatment, on the other hand, seemed to prefer a (D, C) ∞ -type strategy, which is why the effect in that treatment can be seen at the aggregate level.
To test whether the effect of delay on subjects' strategies was significant, we can define subjects' types as follows. For each subject, take all observations in even periods and compute the fraction of such observations where the subject chose the cooperative action two times in a row. Call this number, which indicates the percentage of ordered pairs consistent with a (C, C) ∞ strategy, the subject's (C, C) type. Do the same for the other ordered pairs (D, C), (C, D), and (D, D). This produces a four-dimensional vector for each subject, the elements of which add up to 1. Call this the subject's type. Table 10 shows the average subject types in each of the decision treatments. A t-test with subject-clustered errors shows that the average (D, C) type was about 21% higher in the Tough-Delay treatment than the Tough-NoDelay treatment (P < 0.001). Thus, subjects in the tough treatments were significantly more likely to follow a (D, C)-type strategy in the presence of delay, as suggested by Figure 2 and Result 4. The effect of delay on the average (C, D) type was not significant in the tough treatments (P = 0.649).
Similar comparisons for the lenient treatments show a smaller effect of delay on the average (D, C) type (approximately 7%, P = 0.052) and no significant effect on the average (C, D) type (P = 0.383). These comparisons of averages, however, obscure the fact that a subject who often switches between the (D, C) and (C, D) ordered pairs will both a high (D, C) type and a high (C, D) type. For instance, a subject that randomly switches between these two ordered pairs will have both types equal to 0.5. Similarly, the two types will be equal to 0.5 for an equal mix of subjects who (a) only choose the (D, C) pair and (b) only choose the (C, D) pair, although behavior in the latter case is more systematic.
To better identify subjects who commit to a (D, C) ∞ or (C, D) ∞ -type strategy , Figure   4 shows the correlation between an individual subject's (D, C) and (C, D) types in each of the four decision treatments. It is apparent from the figure that the correlation is high in the Lenient-NoDelay treatment (ρ = 0.6404, P < 0.001) and low in the Lenient-Delay treatment (ρ = −0.1481, P = 0.3886). I.e., a subject in the Lenient-NoDelay treatment with a high (D, C) type also tended to have a high (C, D) type, suggesting that subjects in this treatment were less likely to commit to a fixed pattern of alternating behavior. This is line with the results reported in Figure 3 . Figure 4 shows few subjects with high (C, D) types and low (D, C) types in the ToughDelay treatment. I.e., the subjects in this treatment were less likely to alternate between cooperating in odd periods of the game and defecting in even periods of the game. In the Lenient-Delay treatment, on the other hand, we see both types of alternating strategies. As noted above, the two kinds of alternating strategies in the Lenient-Delay treatment on average canceled each other out.
Discussion
Several behavioral regularities in the decision treatments can be rationalized by the following two assumptions: subjects make mistakes, and the probability of making a mistake is inversely proportional to the percentage loss in supergame payoffs. Intuitively, a game in the Tough-NoDelay treatment lasts for a small number of periods before the computer's punishment strategy kicks in. As a result, the percentage loss in the supergame payoff associated with a single defection is large (on the order of 20%), making defections unlikely. In the Tough-Delay treatment, a single defection to a (C, D) or (D, C) ordered pair leads to a relatively small percentage loss in the supergame payoff (approx. 5%), which makes it more likely. As a result, subjects might cooperate less in the tough treatment with delay than the tough treatment without delay. In the lenient treatments, the percentage losses associated with defections are small with and without delay. As a result, the decision maker is close to randomizing between C and D in Lenient-NoDelay and between (C, C), (D, C), (C, D), and (D, C) in Lenient-Delay. This makes defections likely and brings the average cooperation rate close to 50% in both of the lenient treatments.
To formalize this intuition, letā α represent the optimal and a α the sub-optimal action when the computer's punishment probability equals α in the decision problem without delay. Let U (ā ∞ α ) represent the average lifetime utility of choosing the optimal action forever and U (a α ,ā ∞ α ) the average lifetime utility of deviating once and then playing the optimal action forever. Notice that by definition U (a α ,ā
Assume that the probability of deviating is:
where λ > 0 is a noise parameter. Notice that p(a α ) → 1/2 as λ → ∞ and p(a α ) → 0 as λ → 0. Notice also that the probability of deviating depends on proportional losses associated with the deviation, which makes the argument invariant to changes in subjects' point earnings associated with different action profiles or the conversion rate of points to pesos. Similarly, in the treatment with delay, let aa 1α represent the optimal ordered pair and aa 2α , aa 3α , and aa 4α the suboptimal ones. The probability of choosing an ordered pair i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} can be modeled as:
Notice that the probability of choosing the optimal order pair in the treatment with delay approaches one as λ → 0. When the model above is estimated with maximum likelihood using the data in the decision treatments, the results produce a λ of 0.1356. That the noise parameter is relatively low suggests a good overall fit. Figure 5 shows the cooperation rate predicted by the model in each decision treatment as a function of the supergame period.
39 The figure suggests that the model captures several of the behavioral regularities observed in the data. Most importantly, it captures (i) that subjects cooperate more in the tough treatments, (ii) that the effect of delay is greater in the tough than in the lenient treatments, and (iii) that the cooperation rate in both of the lenient treatments is close to 50%. The model does not capture the extent to which a (D, C)-type strategy is more prevalent in the Tough-Delay treatment than a (C, D)-type strategy. One possibility is that the subjects in the Tough-Delay realized that a (C, D)-type strategy is dominated by a (D, C)-type one and rarely choose the former as a result. Overall, the extent to which the aggregate data can be summarized by a model with a single parameter is noteworthy. While the model above treats all observations in a treatment as coming from a single individual, Figure 2 and Figure 3 suggest that different subjects used different strategies. Some subjects in the Tough-Delay and Lenient-Delay treatments persisted in cooperating in even periods defecting in odd ones while others came close to fully defecting throughout the experiment. The model in Equation 2 and Equation 3 can accomodate the observed persistence in behavior by assuming that the percentage loss from a single defection in the first period of the supergame (e.g., a single defection to (D, C) in the Tough-Delay treatment) determines the probability that the subject makes the same defection (e.g., alternates between D and C) for the duration of the treatment. I.e., if a subject makes a mistake, he or she persists in making the same mistake.
Several other possibilities are worth discussing. Selten et al. (1997) critiques studies of infinitely repeated games in the laboratory as follows:
Infinite supergames cannot be played in the laboratory. Attempts to approximate the strategic situation of an infinite game by the device of a supposedly fixed stopping probability are unsatisfactory since a play cannot be continued beyond the maximum time available. The stopping probability cannot remain fixed but must become one eventually.
In theory, the gains to delay are increasing with δ. If we assume that subjects' effective discount factor in the decision treatments is smaller than 0.95 (what's provided in the instructions), it's possible to rationalize the observation that delay decreases cooperation in the tough treatments. On the other hand, downward distortions in the discount factor cannot explain cooperation rates upward of 50% in both of the lenient treatments.
Another possibility, often assumed away in experiments, 40 is that subjects are not riskneutral. In the decision treatments, risk-averse preferences increase the attractiveness of 40 See, for instance, Sprenger (2015) .
cooperation while risk-seeking preferences increase the attractiveness of defection. One possibility is that the population of subjects consists of both risk-averse and risk-seeking decision makers. If this is the case, risk-seeking preferences might drive cooperation down in the tough treatments and drive defection up in the lenient treatments. An explanation based on risk preferences, however, is at odds with several results of the experiment. First, risk seeking tends to be relatively uncommon in experiments (Charness et al., 2013; Harrison and Rustrom, 2008) ; Dave et al. (2010) , for instance, estimate that only 10.7% of subjects show any degree of risk-seeking. The observed defection rate in the tough treatments (26-29%; see Table 8 ) is much higher than suggested by this estimate. Moreover, no subject in the present experiment showed full cooperation in the Tough-NoDelay treatment, and only one out of 47 subjects showed full cooperation in the Tough-Delay treatment (Figure 2 ). This suggests that even a risk seeking-based explanation would require some degree of randomness to account for the experimental data. On the other hand, randomness provides a good fit even in absence of risk seeking ( Figure 5 ), and it is reasonable to adopt the simpler explanation. Second, if the decision maker's CRRA risk aversion parameter is greater than 0.2125, then cooperation dominates defection in the Lenient-NoDelay treatment. Based on the estimates in Dave et al. (2010) , at least 70% of the subjects should satisfy this criterion. However, the observed average cooperation rate in the Lenient-NoDelay treatment is nowhere near as high as suggested by these calculations, and no subject in the Lenient-NoDelay treatment showed full cooperation, as a reasonably risk-averse decision maker would. Finally, while there is broad consensus in applied economics that choice is stochastic, 41 whether or not laboratory subjects are risk-averse over small stakes is a matter of debate (Rabin, 2000) . Third, an explanation based on risk preferences cannot account for other features of subjects' strategies. For instance, it cannot explain why some subjects in the LenientDelay delay treatment alternated between cooperating and defecting while others alternated between defecting and cooperating ( Figure 3) . On balance, a randomness-based explanation is both simpler and accounts for more of the observed behavioral regularities.
A large experimental literature starting with Gneezy and Potters (1997) has studied the effect of delaying feedback on outcomes of one-shot lotteries. In Gneezy and Potters (1997) , subjects are randomly assigned into either a high (H) or low (L) frequency treatment. In Treatment H, subjects make several identical risky decisions one-by-one and are informed of the realization of the lottery following every decision. In Treatment L, the decisions are made in blocks of three and are informed of the lottery realizations in blocks. Gneezy and Potters (1997) find subjects to be more risk-averse in Treatment H. This finding, typically 41 For instance, this assumption is made in all standard econometric models of discrete choice.
attributed to "myopic loss aversion," has since been replicated in several subsequent experiments (among others, Bellemare et al., 2005; Langer and Weber, 2008; Fellner and Sutter, 2009) .
Unlike most previous studies of myopic loss aversion, the decision treatments here study a dynamic problem rather than a sequence of one-shot decisions. There nevertheless emerges an interesting parallel between the results in the myopic loss aversion literature and those reported here, as the decision to defect in the present experiment is more risky than the decision to cooperate. Pursuing this intuition, Evdokimov (2017) designs a new experiment to test a randomness-based explanation similar to the one presented above against deterministic loss-averse preferences in a setting similar to that used by Gneezy and Potters (1997) . The results of that experiment show evidence consistent with randomness in choice but not loss aversion.
Conclusion
The present paper provides a systematic study of delayed review on behavior in repeated relationships. First, it is shown that delay has no significant effect on cooperation levels in a repeated game with imperfect monitoring where more cooperation is predicted with delay. Second, the game is turned into a decision problem by fixing the opponent's strategy. Here, delay has no overall effect if the opponent's strategy is such that full defection is predicted. If the opponent plays an equilibrium trigger strategy, delay has a cooperationreducing effect. The results in the game treatments are explained by endogenous leniency in subjects' strategies, while those in the decision treatments are explained by assuming an element of randomness in choice.
The main message of this paper is that the cooperation-enhancing effect of delay might in practice be smaller than predicted, which opens several avenues for future research. Followup experiments can use longer evaluation periods, different games, or constructions that allow for communication. The question of how subjects endogenously delay their received information can also be explored further. A future experiment, for instance, can allow subjects to choose whether to participate in a treatment with exogenously delayed review or not. Subjects could also be given an option to communicate their intentions and report the communicated information with delay, as in Rahman (2014) . The experiment in the present paper does not differ from others in the literature in that the standard external validity disclaimer applies. It is possible that the welfare-reducing effect of delay can be mitigated with larger incentives or when decisions are made by professionals. Thus, another direction 30 for future work is to explore the effect of delayed review in the field.
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A Additional Analysis Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 Table 12 : Session and session half effects in the lenient decision treatments. No subjects in the LenientNoDelay treatment participated in Session 4, and no subjects in the Lenient-Delay treatment participated in Session 1. Subjects in the Lenient-NoDelay treatment had a significantly higher (C, C) type than those in the other sessions. No other session or session half effect effect is significant at a 5% level. each round, you and the other player will make choices in real time that will determine both your and the other player's earnings.
Description of a round
Each round will have several periods. In every period of the round, you can choose between • an orange button, which pays you 10 points if the other player chooses orange and subtracts 5 points if the other player chooses purple; • a purple button, which pays you 20 points if the other player chooses orange and 0 points if the other player chooses purple.
At the beginning of the next period of the round, the computer will randomly draw a number, called Draw A, between 0 and 1. If the result of Draw A is less than or equal to 0.05, then the computer will end the round. In this case, you will observe the outcome of Draw A and a screen informing you that the round is over.
If the result of Draw A is greater than 0.05, then the interaction will continue for another period. In this case, the computer will generate a signal as follows:
• If you and the other player both chose orange, the signal will be positive with 70% probability and negative with 30% probability • If either you or the other player (or both) chose purple, the signal will be positive with 10% probability and negative with 90% probability.
Note:
The signals are independent across periods. This means that observing any one signal gives you no information about what any other signal will be. The signal in any given period only depends on your choice in the previous period (orange or purple), the choice of the other player in the previous period (orange or purple), and chance. You will only observe these signals in odd periods of the game.
In any period of the round, if the result of Draw A is greater than 0.05 and the period is even, then you will observe the result of Draw A, and a screen asking you to choose orange or purple. Note that you will not observe the signal that was generated at the beginning of the period, since the period is even.
In any period of the round, if the result of Draw A is greater than 0.05, the period is odd, then you will observe the result of Draw A, the signals that were generated in the previous two periods, and a screen asking you to choose orange or purple.
Thus, in period 1 of each round, you will observe only a screen asking you to choose orange or purple. In period 2, if the result of Draw A at the beginning of period 2 is greater than 0.05, you will observe the result of Draw A in this period and a screen asking you to choose orange or purple. Note that you will not observe the signal that was generated at the beginning of the period, since the period is even. In period 3, if the result of Draw A at the beginning of period 3 is greater than 0.05, you will observe the result of Draw A in this period, the signals that were generated in the previous two periods, and a screen asking you to choose orange or purple, etc.
Overall earnings
Points earned in the experiment will be converted into pesos at a rate of 4 points per peso. In addition to your earnings from all periods and rounds, you will be given 500 points to avoid the possibility that your earnings are negative. For example, if you earn 400 points across all periods and rounds, your earnings in pesos will be 500+400=900 points, or 225 pesos (plus your earnings from the quiz).
Questions
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
This part of this experiment has 150 rounds. In each round, you will interact with a computer program and make choices in real time.
Description of a round
Each round will have several periods. How many periods the round will have is going to depend on your decisions as well as chance.
In every period of the round, you can choose between  an orange button, which pays you 10 points, and  a purple button, which pays you 20 points.
At the beginning of the next period of the round, the computer will randomly draw a number, Draw A, between 0 and 1.
What happens next is described in detail below and illustrated graphically on the back of this page.
In any period of the round, if Draw A is less than or equal to 0.05, then the computer will end the round. In this case, you will observe the outcome of Draw A and a screen informing you that the round is over.
In any period of the round, if Draw A is greater than 0.05, then the computer will generate a signal as follows:  If you chose orange, the signal will be positive with 70% probability and negative with 30% probability  If you chose purple, the signal will be positive with 10% probability and negative with 90% probability.
Note:
The signals are independent across periods. This means that observing any one signal gives you no information about what any other signal will be. The signal in any given period only depends on your choice in the previous period (orange or purple) as well as chance.
In any period of the round, if Draw A is greater than 0.05 and the signal generated by the computer is positive, then the interaction will continue for another period. In this case, you will observe the outcome of Draw A, the signal that was generated, and a screen asking you to choose orange or purple.
In any period of the round, if Draw A is greater than 0.05 and the signal generated by the computer is negative, then the computer will randomly draw another number, Draw B, between 0 and 1. If Draw B is less than or equal to 0.8, then the computer will end the round in this period. In this case, you will observe the outcome of Draw A, the signal that was generated, the outcome of Draw B, and a screen informing you that the round is over.
In any period of the round, if Draw A is greater than 0.05, the signal generated by the computer is negative, and Draw B is greater than 0.8, then the interaction will continue for another period. In this case, you will observe the outcome of Draw A, the signal that was generated, the outcome of Draw B, and a screen asking you to choose orange or purple.
Overall earnings
Points will be converted into pesos at a rate of 80 points per peso. For example, if you earn 8000 points across all periods and rounds in the experiment, your total earnings in pesos will be 100 pesos. We will round your overall earnings to the nearest peso.
Questions
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. This part of this experiment has 50 rounds. In each round, you will interact with a computer program and make choices in real time.
Description of a round
Note:
The signals are independent across periods. This means that observing any one signal gives you no information about what any other signal will be. The signal in any given period only depends on your choice in the previous period (orange or purple) as well as chance. You will only observe these signals in odd periods of the game.
In any period of the round, if Draw A is greater than 0.05 and the period is even, then you will observe the outcome of Draw A, and a screen asking you to choose orange or purple. Note that you will not observe the signal that was generated at the beginning of the period, since the period is even.
In any period of the round, if Draw A is greater than 0.05, the period is odd, and one of the previous two signals is positive, then the interaction will continue for another period. In this case, you will observe the outcome of Draw A, the signals that were generated in the previous two periods, and a screen asking you to choose orange or purple.
In any period of the round, if Draw A is greater than 0.05, the period is odd, and both of the previous two signals are negative, then the computer will randomly draw another number, Draw B, between 0 and 1. If Draw B is less than or equal to 0.8, then the computer will end the round in this period. In this case, you will observe the outcome of Draw A, the signals that were generated in the previous two periods, the outcome of Draw B, and a screen informing you that the round is over.
In any period of the round, if Draw A is greater than 0.05, the period is odd, both of the previous two signals are negative, and Draw B is greater than 0.8, then the interaction will continue for another period. In this case, you will observe, the outcome of Draw A, the signals that were generated in the previous two periods, the outcome of Draw B, and a screen asking you to choose orange or purple.
Overall earnings
Questions
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
